Liberation & religion: Constitutionalism remains the lodestar

One fascinating South Asian feature is how its three most populous countries founded their independence upon western constitutional precepts. Jawaharlal Nehru's "tryst with destiny" was built upon a firm faith in a parliamentary constitution, which has somehow survived in that country to this day, somewhat dented every now and then, but still intact, in large part due to Nehru's guidance for over one decade at the very start. Pakistan's biggest constitutional champion was its Founding Father himself, Mohammad Ali Jinnah, a lawyer no less. His early passage did not leave enough for other constitutionalists to overcome the power-hungry opportunists. Bangladesh could not but embrace constitutionalism because it was denied the reins of power following Pakistan's freest and fairest election in November/December 1970.

All three face severe challenges, albeit in India it has only just begun in the form of Ma Bharatiya and Hindu fundamentalism. In Pakistan, they were the military and religion, in that order: religion has always been strong in Pakistan, indeed could be construed as one of the driving forces, though under secular and not jihadi control regardless of the impact of Moulana Maududi had for over an entire generation. In Bangladesh that same Pakistani mixture resurfaced, only this time with religion driving the military: recall how its secular military overthrew the 'secular' pillar for an 'Islamic Republic' in 1978. Extant scholarship describes Bangladesh's case well, but an array of forces also escaped that scholarship's net.

In an astute article, Akhand Akhtar Hossain of the University of Newcastle, Australia, reduced the "resurgence of Islam" to "sustained misgovernance" and "global factors." He went on to add how the wartime principles/pillars of nationalism, democracy, socialism, and secularism were not only "largely alien slogans," but also "imposed from above." Many developments support his contention, but then many do not: nationalism, for example, was as grassroots as one could have it, and as evident in the 167 seats the Awami League won in 1970, out of 169, in East Pakistan, an event also depicting democracy to be overwhelmingly inclusive, rather than "from above." It was true then, but this feature has been rattled since.

What is even more striking is the absence of 1971 liberation war influences upon the evolution of religion. Arguably these are what pushed religion to, first, seek a military outlet in Bangladesh after 1975, and second, contest the well-entrenched military in Pakistan for control from the 1980s when General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq became Pakistan's first Islam-driven general administering the country. In a tragedy of errors, his road was paved by General Yahya Khan in 1971 across Bangladesh.

Religion became the preferred tool of General Tikka Khan during his East Pakistan stay to make civilians toe his line during 1971. Hardly utilised with any strategy, plan, role, or value, it simply served as the instrument whereby military guilt (from genocidal or rapist accusations) could be deflected to barbaric-minded civilians. Some of them were overenthusiastic non-Bangalees already living in Bangladesh. Some believe they were the key culprits behind the widespread rape incidences. Yet, they would also find competition from North West Frontier Province Rangers. They were deployed to demean Bangalees viscerally, with rape as one instrument, but also all forms of extractions through camps installed in abandoned buildings.

At the top of this ranking were the al-Badr and al-Shams. Paraphrasing another episode from a far-flung country at a quite different time, their names would live in infamy: their most overt and despicable acts included the murder of our handful of intellectuals in the closing days of the liberation war. Though the al-Badr and al-Shams institutions never planted local roots, the inherent mindset remained to haunt us even to this day.

That mindset aligned most naturally with the Jamaat-i-Islam, the institution Maudidi created right after the Lahore Resolution was adopted as the beacon to create Pakistan in 1940. Every Pakistani military and bureaucratic establishment could hold off this force until the Bangladesh liberation war, which then provided the military the motive and opportunity to put the Jamaati to use, but which the Jamaati utilised, through top-notch connections, to spiral to power. It overtook the military by the 1980s in both Bangladesh and Pakistan. In both countries a military-religion axis emerged; and in both declining reverence for the military may stem from this association. Democratic elections have become the greatest threat the Jamaati faces.

Inside Bangladesh, the Jamaat-i-Islam's 1971 role fed the recently concluded war crimes trials: until those trials were brought to a logical end, the religious ghost that sparked events like the simultaneous 2005 bombings (500 of them in 300 locations across 63 of the country's 64 districts), the 2013 Hefajat-i-Islam Shapla Square mobilisation, and 2016 Holey Bakery restaurant terror incident, imposed threats and instilled fear. It is hard to ever say if that reality and fear can be, or has been, fully expunged: after all, Bangalees are a very traditional, conservative, and religious people, but also equally determined to stop at the water's edge before extremism, Islamic or otherwise, take over. They can still be pushed across that line, much in the way Akhtar Hossain predicted: through "sustained misgovernance" or "global factors."

These should serve as the 2018 Victory Day clarion calls. A democratic election in 2009, which was almost as fair and free as the fairest and freest we have ever had, in November/December 1970, saved us from sustaining mis-governance, whose ugly head appeared again in 2014, only to be snuffed. Older, wiser, and with the war crimes trials more or less concluded, we need to return full-fledged to mainstream democracy. Our finest innings await us there, and it would be the most gracious of tributes to each and every 1971 martyr.

On the other hand, "global factors" continue knocking on our doors. With over a million Rohingya refugees camping on Bangladesh soil, we have to step outside the box yet again to insulate them from taking any jihadi turns. The war crimes trials may be over, felling a long list of traitors and anarchists, but new recruits from refugee ranks could easily replace them. This does not mean we must step up our guard against, and keep our distance from, the refugees. We must handle them with how our scriptures would want us to: with dignity, sympathy, humanly, honourably, and symmetrically. We were in their shoes before, meaning being at or neighbourly best is our way henceforth.

Very much like Lord Acton's freedom, eternal vigilance must be the price of our faith.

Dr. Imtiaz A. Hussain is Professor & Head of the Department of Global Studies & Governance at Independent University, Bangladesh.

[email protected]