Bangladesh's chronic gas shortage has now entered an acute phase following the shutdown of one of the two floating storage and regasification units (FSRUs) at Maheshkhali in Cox's Bazar. The country's daily demand for gas is around 3.8 billion cubic feet, while a supply of about 3.0 billion cubic feet is considered necessary to avoid serious shortages. But the average supply had fallen to around 2.7 billion cubic feet before the latest disruption. Following the fire and technical fault at the FSRU terminal run by the US company, Excelerate Energy, the gas supply has dropped further to around 2.2 billion cubic feet. The shutdown has taken about 450 million cubic feet of gas per day (450 mmcfd) out of the national grid. That the disruption at a single facility could widen the supply deficit to approximately 1.6 billion cubic feet speaks volumes for the fragility of the country's energy system. Imported liquefied natural gas (LNG) now accounts for about 35 to 40 per cent of the total gas supply. So, when one of the two import terminals goes out of operation, the impact is immediately felt across the economy. Ordinary people experience this shortage not as statistics but as an interruption in their daily lives. Households in different areas of Dhaka are unable to cook despite paying their monthly gas bills.
Many families have been compelled to buy Liquefied Petroleum Gas (LPG) cylinders or use electric stoves, adding another expenditure to their already strained household budgets. Long queues are forming at CNG filling stations, while some stations are receiving gas at a pressure of one pound per square inch (PSI) or even zero. Electricity generation from gas-fired plants has reportedly fallen from more than 5,000 megawatts to around 4,000 MW. Industries that require about 10 PSI of pressure to operate their captive generators are receiving less than one PSI in some areas. As a result, factories are either reducing production, suspending operations or turning to expensive alternative fuels. The same gas shortage is thus increasing household expenditure, transport costs, electricity-generation costs and industrial production costs at the same time. The greater danger, however, lies beyond the kitchens, filling stations and factory floors. It lies in the agricultural fields.
According to reports, the seven state-owned fertiliser factories have a combined annual production capacity of more than 3.7 million tonnes. Yet they produced only 1.106 million tonnes in FY 2025-26 against the country's total fertiliser demand of 6.6 million tonnes. Five of the seven factories are now closed, leaving only two in operation. The gas-based fertiliser plants under the Bangladesh Chemical Industries Corporation (BCIC) require around 197 million cubic feet of gas per day (197 mmcfd) to run at full capacity. But they usually receive only about one-third of that amount. According to an estimate, if uninterrupted gas supply could be ensured, the factories would produce an additional 2.2 million to 2.5 million tonnes of fertiliser last fiscal year.
This is no small production loss. Urea is not an optional industrial product. It is one of the principal inputs for growing rice, the staple food of the population. Bangladesh requires approximately 2.6 million to 2.7 million tonnes of urea annually, particularly for the Aman and Boro seasons. When domestic factories remain idle for want of gas, the government has little choice but to import larger quantities of fertiliser using precious foreign currency. At a first glance, importing fertiliser might appear to be an easy substitute for domestic production. But imports expose the country to volatile prices, disrupted shipping routes and geopolitical conflicts. Bangladesh is importing LNG to meet its gas deficit. If that imported gas cannot keep fertiliser factories running, the government has to import the fertiliser as well. Agriculture ministry officials have assured that the existing stock of close to 1.62 million tonnes of different fertilisers is sufficient to meet demand through October. That is reassuring for the ongoing Aman season. But a stockpile is a temporary buffer, not a long-term policy. Shipments under an import agreement with Saudi Arabia have already faced delays because of the security situation around the Strait of Hormuz. What will happen if further deliveries are delayed or international fertiliser prices rise before the next major cultivation season? Gas shortage is not the only reason behind the poor performance of domestic fertiliser factories. Five of the seven state-owned plants were established between 1965 and 2006. Ageing machinery, frequent breakdowns and inefficient production systems have reduced their effective capacity.
The country's only state-owned Diammonium Phosphate (DAP) factory has also been unable to obtain phosphoric acid after international suppliers declined to participate in repeated tenders amid market volatility. So, merely restoring gas supply will not resolve every problem. The government needs a plant-by-plant technical and financial assessment to determine which factories should be modernised, which should be replaced and which can produce fertiliser competitively. Feeding scarce gas to inefficient machinery without rehabilitation would only replace one kind of waste with another. The immediate task is to restore the affected FSRU and disclose the cause and extent of the fault. Petrobangla has not so far provided any definite timeline for resuming operations. An independent technical investigation should follow. Maintenance standards, spare-parts availability and emergency-response arrangements at both terminals must also be reviewed.
At the same time, the available gas should be allocated according to a transparent national priority plan linked to the agricultural calendar. The most efficient fertiliser plants should receive predictable supplies during critical production periods. Fertiliser stocks, imports, distribution and dealer-level prices should be published regularly to prevent rumours, artificial shortages and hoarding. The government's plans to drill 100 wells, rehabilitate old fields, bring Bhola gas to the mainland and accelerate onshore and offshore exploration are welcome.
But such plans have to move beyond announcements. Building more FSRUs may increase import capacity, but it will not by itself create energy security. Rather, without increased domestic production, diversified supply routes and greater use of renewable energy, it may deepen dependence on an expensive and volatile global LNG market. Gas policy cannot remain an exercise in crisis management. The extinguished kitchen stove, the queue at a CNG station, the idle factory and the missing bag of fertiliser are different manifestations of the same structural failure. Unless the government treats gas security as an integral part of food and economic security, today's temporary inconvenience may turn into tomorrow's agricultural emergency. The latest supply disruption is a reminder that gas is not merely a household fuel or industrial input. It is inseparably linked to fertiliser, farming and the price of food.
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