Trump's Gaza plan: a Hobson's choice for Hamas?

The most crucial issues relate to withdrawal of IDF from Gaza, the surrender of arms by Hamas, establishment of ISF and agreement by all parties on a time-bound pathway to an independent state of Palestine. All these have to happen at the same time, in signed documents and on the ground in Gaza

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Hasnat Abdul Hye

Departing from the ongoing procedure of reaching ceasefire or ending the war in Gaza, through negotiations mediated by Qatar and Egypt, president Trump sprung a surprise by unveiling a 20-point peace deal to end the war, bring back all the hostages and offer a wisp of hope for a ‘pathway’ to a Palestine state in future. This initiative by an American president is suspect ab initio because of the longstanding close relations between America and Israel and America’s unstinted support given in the genocidal war in Gaza. President Trump has not done anything to prove his credentials as a honest broker in the Israeli-Palestine conflict during his second term, either by pronouncements or by his deeds. On the contrary, notwithstanding the global condemnation of the genocidal war waged by Israel, he has publicly exhorted it to ‘finish the job’ in Gaza, meaning to reduce the strip to a wasteland so that his dream real estate project can take shape.  So, his sudden incarnation as an apostle for peace at first sight cannot but appear as dubious as well as mischievous. Following the adage that the test of the pudding is in the eating, a close look at his 20-points peace deal will reveal what it is all about and whether the proposed  deal will end the war, paving the ‘pathway’ to permanent peace in the troubled land of Palestine.

According to newspaper reports, president Trump told the Arab and Muslim leaders at the meeting on September 23 on the sidelines of UN General Assembly session about his proposed Gaza plan or deal and his middle-east envoy Witkoff gave them a copy of the same. He discussed the plan with Israeli Prime Minister Netanyahu when he met him at the White House on September 29. Netanyahu’s unconditional and instant acceptance of the 20-point deal implied that he had seen it earlier and papered over whatever differences of views were there in the original draft through discussion with   American interlocutors. Alternatively, the plan might have been jointly drawn up by Israelis and American officials earlier to ensure Israeli acceptance  of the same in public later.

What is glaring in this diplomatic pyrotechnics is the absence of the Palestinians during the first presentation of the plan that affected their lives directly. Hamas received the plan through Qatar on September 30 and was given a period of 3/4 four days by president Trump to agree on plan or ‘all hell breaking loose’ on them if they failed to do so. It is a classic case of a Hobson’s choice which says ‘either take it or leave it’ to your peril. The 20-point peace deal as it stands now is a poisoned chalice and not a negotiating framework to manoeuvre for Hamas. Yet, it is such a political trap that Hamas may find many of the countries supporting morally leaving them in the lurch should they dare to turn it down outright. The stark choice staring them in the face is between their total annihilation, more deaths of Gazans, destruction of Gaza city or capitulation to save lives, avoid further evacuation and destructions with the uncertain hope of a Palestine state in the distant future. It is a tough choice to make for a group of freedom fighters who have placed a great store by national freedom placing it above individual lives. Before commenting on the cautious response of Hamas to the 20-point deal a closer look at the points one by one may reveal their implications for Hamas, Palestinians, Israelis and America, the dramatic personae in this tragic conflict.

Point number one focuses on de-radicalisation of the Palestinian minds that will make them friendly and accommodative to the Israelis by removing texts in school syllabus, banning speeches made by social, political and religious leaders. This takes care of the ground reality in occupied Palestinian land. Once the occupation is   terminated and a Palestine state is created radicalisation will peter out. So, this point begs the question about what is going to be done now to remove the cause for radicalisation. Secondly, vilifications   and deionisation of the ‘Other’ is not only on the side of Palestinians alone but is equally applicable to the Israelis, particularly their messianic extremists. Point number one should be aimed at both the parties.

The second point in the Plan refers to re-development for the people of Gaza. This point is well taken and has a sense of urgency. To ensure a sense of ownership in the massive re-development projects, the Palestinians must have a meaningful role in planning and allocating the assets created. This agency of Palestinians is missing as the point stands now.

Point number three provides for immediate ceasefire, withdrawal of Israeli Defence Force (IDF) to an agreed line, ‘freezing present battle lines’ till conditions are met for full, staged withdrawals  are met. With only pockets of the city of Gaza still free, the freezing of battle lines will mean that almost  the whole of Gaza strip will be under military  occupation. This makes withdrawal to ‘an agreed line’ an academic exercise.

According to point four, within 72 hours of Israel publicly accepting the ‘deal’ all hostages will be released.  Provision of release of Palestinians from Israeli prisons occurs in the next point (5), subsequent to the release of hostages. Hamas is likely to say that these should be simultaneous, as in the past two ceasefires. About the number of Palestinians released, Hamas should have a say about the high profile prisoners lest they end up with release of mostly minor offenders to fill up the number in the Plan.

Point number six provides for disarming of Hamas and granting them amnesty and safe passage to other countries. This is hard for Hamas to accept as long as IDF continues to occupy Gaza. This should coincide with simultaneous withdrawal of IDF from Gaza and taking over by a transitional international armed forces. Point seven and eight are the least problematic as these include reconstruction of roads, restoration of water, electricity, opening of bakery, functioning of hospitals  and most importantly, resumption  of humanitarian aid by UN agencies at the  level agreed upon  during January, 2025 ceasefire. Point nine is a mixed bag, containing provision for a transitional technocratic government and a Board  of Peace headed by president Trump with members like former British premier Tony Blair. While the idea of a technocratic government is an easy  sale, the Palestinians would feel more secure if president Trump and Tony Blair are not in the board because of their well-known  bias towards Israel and involvement in the Great Trust Plan for Gaza. They would rather like to see a neutral person like the Secretary General of the UN heading this ‘oversight’ authority. With president Trump as the head of the civil authority and Tony Blair as his assistant it would look like a case of neo-imperialism. Under point 10, a development plan will be drawn up by experts from ‘successful middle-eastern cities’ to attract investors from middle- east and elsewhere. Palestinians would like their interests to be represented in this process. But this does not appear as too contentious. Point 11 envisages creating a special economic zone  for foreign investors, a throwback to president Trump’s pet   projects for tourism and high tech hubs within the overarching vision  of a Mediterranean   Riviera. Allowing Palestinians a role in the administration of this zone will make this more or less acceptable to them. Point 12 assures that no one will be forced to leave Gaza and those willing to leave will be free to return. Apparently innocuous, this includes the possibility of so-called ‘voluntary emigration’ or ‘temporary relocation’ with the excuse of reconstruction imperatives. As such, Palestinians will be wary and apprehensive about the implications of this seemingly anodyne point. Point number 13 stresses that Hamas will have no role in the governance of Gaza and will go through de-militarisation immediately. While agreeing to the first part of the stipulation, Hamas may insist on their surrendering of arms with simultaneous withdrawal of IDF and establishment of an international peacekeeping force. Point 14 requires Arab countries to guarantee the compliance of terms and conditions of the deal by Hamas. This poses no problem provided the terms and conditions are agreed to by Hamas through negotiation beforehand. Point 15 is very important, the establishment of a Transitional Stabilisation Force (TSF), comprising American and Arab countries. Hamas cannot have two opinions on this and is likely to have this on the ground before they start surrendering their arms. Equally important is point 16 that  assures that Israel will not annex  or occupy Gaza and that IDF will gradually withdraw based on acceptable standards, milestones  and a timeframe. But the priviso that IDF will remain within a perimeter in Gaza for security reasons will be unacceptable to the Palestinians as that would mean part of their land being permanently occupied and also creating a land and sea blockade. The security concerns of Israel can be taken care of on their side of the border. Point 17 stipulates that in the event of Hamas refusing to agree to the deal, aid operations will proceed in the conflict free areas that would be handed over by IDF to ISF. This, too, appears to be beyond controversy. But the catch is that the ‘terror free areas’ would be those that are occupied by IDF assault first. Given the scorched earth policy followed by IDF so far, these will be wastelands with no infrastructures and perhaps resident Gazans. Under point 18 an interfaith dialogue process would be initiated for better mutual understanding between Israelis and Palestinians.  Harmless as it is, unanimity on this will be readily found.  Point 19 is the most significant of all as it stipulates that when the Palestinian Authority’s (PA) reform process is satisfactory the conditions may finally be in place for a credible pathway to Palestinian self- determination and statehood recognising that aspiration. This condition makes attaining statehood dependent on external perception (Board of Peace) about fulfilment of conditions by PA. Why Palestine statehood should depend on Palestine Authority’s   reforms when they don’t represent the Gaza population?  Why not hold general election after one or two years and see which representatives are elected to run the Palestine government in both Gaza and the West Bank ? These are the questions that would  be asked by majority of Palestinians including Hamas.

Point number 20 underlines a dialogue between Israel and Palestine to ‘agree on a political horizon’ for peaceful co- existence. If this is after the establishment of Palestine state there would be no objection to this. But if this is made a condition for statehood, it will be rejected by the Palestinians.

A review of the 20 points shows that these contain the basis for a permanent solution of the Palestine -Israel conflict. But there need to be modifications in the terms and conditions in some of the points to make it acceptable to the Palestinians. The most crucial issues relate to withdrawal of IDF from Gaza, the surrender of arms by Hamas, establishment of ISF and agreement by all parties on a time- bound pathway to an independent state of Palestine.  All these have to happen at the same time, in signed documents and on the ground in Gaza. Israel’s agreement to ceasefire does not guarantee its continuance into a cessation of war as Israel has reneged on ceasefire agreement before, in February this year. As regards reform of Palestine Authority (PA) as a prior condition of creating the state of Palestine, it should be pointed out that it (PA) is a  leftover of the Oslo Accord  which became a dead letter long ago. This dinosaur should become a museum piece. The people of Palestine should elect the representatives to make rules and govern, just as any other sovereign state does.

Meanwhile, Hamas has responded positively to the deal in general, proposing negotiation to smooth over the sticking points. If president Trump agrees to this, then his 20- point deal will not be seen as a text bookcase of a Hobson’s choice. These points, instead of being wrapped in the guise of an ultimatum, will morph into a historic peace agreement reached through meticulous negotiations. President Trump is almost on his way to Oslo, to receive this year’s Nobel peace prize. It would be a pity if he were to miss it by being obstinate and egomaniacal.

hasnat.hye5@gmail.com