Britain's Brexit conundrum

It took long three years for Britain to become a member of European Community (EC), the predecessor of European Union (EU) because as a late comer to the European association of nations promoted by France and Germany it had to go through a convoluted negotiation process to prove its bona fide. That France's then president Charles de Gaulle was not very enthusiastic about admitting the 'island nation' into EC did not make it easy for Britain to pass all the tests as a cake walk. As the leading member of EC's competing bloc, the European Free Trade Area (EFTA), Britain was at first critical, even scornful about the prospect of EC. It was the issue of leadership in Europe on which Britain had negative attitude towards EC and the Franco-German leadership had reservations about Britain on the same score. The rivalry over determining Europe's destiny went far back into the past but it influenced the leaders' thoughts on both sides of English Channel in the post-War era. Moreover, Charles de Gaulle did not forget his humiliating years of exile in Britain where he was sidestepped in almost all major military decisions. It was no surprise that nudged by him, the negotiators of EC put up one stumbling block after another before Britain. When membership was granted, after a prolonged and gruelling negotiation, Britain was relieved of the uncertainty but healing of bruised feelings did not come any time soon.

Membership in EC and later into European Union was like a pyrrhic victory and a feeling of bonhomie hardly overwhelmed Britain soon after admission as a member, or even later. Britain became the most vocal member of EU before long, criticising its policies mainly on the ground of undermining sovereignty of member states and the growing burden of contributing to the budget of EU. The Common Agricultural Policy and aid for the relatively backward members also came in for a fair measure of criticism from Britain. This lack of agreement between Britain and the rest of EU resulted in Britain keeping out of Schenzen visa system, the common currency area (euro) and the social policy of EU making it almost an outsider. These decisions only served to deepen the suspicion of France and Germany about the commitment of Britain for strengthening the European compact. Going its separate way in the major areas of unification Britain not only maintained its separate stance on Europe's future but also kept on piling up demands for concessions from the EU. Even after major concessions were made by EU, the British government under David Cameron felt that those were inadequate and decided to call a referendum to decide whether to remain or exit from EU, the latter being abbreviated as Brexit. It took the European leaders by surprise, confirming their suspicion about the seriousness of Britain for a united Europe. It was a foregone conclusion that the terms of exit agreed by EU would not be generous and easy. Again, Britain was in for another round of gruelling negotiations, this time to get out of the European club.

With 51 per cent of British voters opting for exit (Brexit) the popular verdict was anything but overwhelmingly in favour. To take a decision on such a thin majority was going to be problematic but the British government took the plunge almost post haste. David Cameron handed over the powers to Theresa May to take care of the transition to Brexit. Little did the new prime minister realise that she was inheriting a poisoned chalice. Before long her life at No. 10 Downing Street became a continuous nightmare about the ways and means of finalising Brexit with minimum damage to the British economy. On the one hand, she had to contend with the unsympathetic attitude of European leaders who were in no mood to offer a golden handshake to Britain. On the other, she had to fend off moves backstage by ambitious leaders of her party, vying with each other for the top job. It did not strengthen her hand that she was not the undisputed leader of Conservative party when she took over the mantle of power from Cameron. It has remained her Achilles' heel ever since, allowing sniper-like actions from her ambitious colleagues. The fact that she was not a pro-Brexiteer before the resignation of David Cameron added to her disadvantage. But she didn't lose time to play to the gallery of Brexiteers and hardline leaders on the issue of Brexit. Soon after taking office she declared, 'Brexit is Brexit', meaning there would be no sweet deal with the EU leading to Brexit. This discouraged the aspirants to No. 10 Downing Street from mounting any immediate move to unseat the new prime minister. But the bold and defiant statement also hardened the attitude of EU leaders over the terms for Britain's departure from EU.

As time passed, Theresa May came face to face with the hard realities and implications of Brexit. The economic consequences of Brexit without a soft deal as presented to her by analysts and the business and industrial lobby appeared staggering and daunting. Not only Britain would lose the duty-free access to the common market of EU, investment in the financial and manufacturing sectors would also receive severe battering as investors would seek friendly haven within the EU or elsewhere. The closure of open border between the two Irelands would pose a great threat to the peace process, in addition to inflicting economic damage to Northern Ireland. The only areas where Britain will feel as winner would be immigration, independence from EU laws and regulations and annual contributions to the EU budget. But the last would not be an unqualified benefit as Britain would be required to pay anywhere between 50 to 80 billion pound sterling as fee to the EU for separation.

After a great deal of soul searching, calculation and lacklustre talks with EU leaders over the terms of Brexit, Theresa May had her moment of reckoning. In the first week of July she convened a meeting of the cabinet at Chequers, the official country retreat of the prime minister, and presented an outline for a deal of Brexit. Her plan set Britain on the path to a soft Brexit and marked a sharp shift from her previous position. The old approach had consisted mainly of ruling things out: no free movement of labour, no single market membership, no obedience to foreign judges. In the new plan she was specific and said categorically what she wanted. She proposed that Britain remain, in effect, in the single market for goods, and in a looser system of mutual recognition for services. In return she promised not to undercut EU standards for the environment, social policies or state aid. She proposed a dispute-resolution mechanism that implies a role for the European Court of Justice. Finally, she suggested that Britain stay in a customs union with the EU until a new tariff-collection mechanism could be set up.

Not many within her cabinet were enthusiastic about the new plan, while a few were livid with anger over what they saw as betrayal and capitulation to the EU over Brexit. Two prominent members of the cabinet, the Foreign Secretary and the Secretary on Brexit, and two Vice-chairmen of Conservative party resigned immediately in protest. Boris Johnson, the flamboyant foreign secretary, said in his resignation letter that 'Brexit dream is dying'. Others inveighed, alleging that Britain would become a colony of EU without representation at the decision making level. The resignations by high-profile figures were followed by rumblings within the ranks of the parliamentary members of the ruling party, with dark forebodings about the outcome of a no-confidence vote against the prime minister. With the parliament closed for holiday Theresa May has a reprieve until the autumn session. She has to take a major decision before then regarding the deal for Brexit that would be put up for negotiation with the EU.

Theresa May's problem is not only with her own cabinet or party members. In all likelihood, European leaders would demand that she goes beyond her Chequer's plan. They would insist that the issue of the border between two Irelands be settled before any deal can be signed. Britain is also likely to be told that, if it wants the benefits of the single market for goods, it must comply with other EU rules, including free movement of labour. The EU would probably want Britain to make ongoing payments into its budgets. This will lead to a Brexit that will satisfy almost no group.

Given the bleak prospect for a soft Brexit as outlined in the Checquer's plan, both within Britain and in EU, Theresa May gambles with the idea of a 'no deal' Brexit. If she does, it will have two goals, both tactical in nature and not as part of strategy. Firstly, it may be used as a negotiating tactic with the EU. Secondly, it may be used as a ploy to garner support at home for the Chequer's plan by showing voters the negative consequences that would result from a 'no deal' exit. Here the reasoning is that the economic fallout for a 'no deal' exit would be so overwhelmingly disastrous that it would not be thought of as a viable option. But the public opinion has already shown that the worst case scenario of 'no deal' will not be seen as a setback by hardline Brexiteers. Rebuffed, Theresa May could use the nuclear option i.e. call for an election. But if she does so she will be wading into uncertain waters, not least because the Labour party led by Jeremy Corbyn is waiting in the wings with some lead in the public opinion polls.

There is a fourth option, the most sensible under the circumstances: to call a new referendum. With only 51 per cent of the voters opting for Brexit it cannot be said that the public opinion is overwhelmingly in favour of Brexit. Moreover, the referendum was held hastily, without clarifying all the issues involved in Brexit. If all the implications for the economy of Brexit are explained in details the British voters may change their mind. It is puzzling that a mature democracy like Britain should have ignored this important aspect of informing the public about the consequences of their decision, one way or the other. It may not be too late to make amends for that mistake. The present deadlock over a deal for negotiation with the EU makes it immensely sensible to have a fresh verdict from the British public enlightened with adequate information about all aspects of Brexit. If the majority vote for Brexit it will strengthen the hands of the British government in the negotiation with the EU. If the verdict is in favour of remaining within EU the British government can ask for concessions in the most sensitive areas like immigration. Brexit or no Brexit, there has to be give and take from both sides.      

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