Rebooting Indo-Bangla ties: Ball in India's court

Relations between Bangladesh and India, bound by geography and history, have entered one of their most fragile phases in decades. The strains are not merely the residue of 1971 or the by-products of neighbourhood asymmetry. They are rooted in recent political upheavals that have reshaped Dhaka's domestic landscape and forced a reckoning with New Delhi's long-standing approach to its eastern neighbour.

For much of the past decade and a half, India was seen in Bangladesh as the principal external backer of Sheikh Hasina's government. Delhi offered diplomatic cover during three fiercely disputed elections and maintained close security and economic cooperation even as criticism mounted over democratic backsliding. That posture generated unease among opposition groups and civil society; it hardened into resentment after Hasina's dramatic fall from power in 2024.

The rupture deepened when India granted Hasina refuge and declined Dhaka's formal request for her extradition, even after she was sentenced to death in absentia over crimes linked to the 2024 crackdown. For many Bangladeshis -- particularly the youth activists who spearheaded the uprising -- this decision confirmed a suspicion that India's strategic calculations took precedence over Bangladesh's internal democratic processes. In street politics, anti-India slogans became a recurring motif, further inflamed by the murder of Osman Hadi, a prominent protest leader known for his outspoken criticism of Indian influence.

The atmosphere was further poisoned by dozens of Indian media outlets, who unleashed an information war through misleading or false reports, AI-generated deepfakes and religiously offensive messaging against Bangladesh.

Even seemingly peripheral disputes -- from exclusions in the Indian Premier League to wrangling over cricket World Cup venues -- fed a narrative of Indian hostility in the popular imagination.

Yet this is not a story of irretrievable estrangement. It is a moment of recalibration.

India and Bangladesh share a 4,000km border, intertwined supply chains and deeply enmeshed social ties. Trade has grown steadily over the past decade; energy connectivity, cross-border rail links and digital cooperation have expanded. India's role in Bangladesh's 1971 Liberation War -- when Indian military intervention decisively tilted the balance against Pakistan -- remains acknowledged across the political spectrum. But history cannot serve as perpetual collateral. In Delhi's strategic circles, there has sometimes been a tendency to treat 1971 as a licence for influence rather than the foundation for an equal partnership. In today's Bangladesh, that posture is politically untenable.

The new government in Dhaka, led by Prime Minister Tarique Rahman, has signalled a pragmatic, if cautious, approach. Rahman has emphasised cooperation on trade, border governance and regional stability. At the same time, he has rejected any suggestion that Bangladesh should be viewed as a client state or confined to a single strategic orbit. Officials in the foreign ministry have echoed this tone, stressing that Dhaka seeks good relations with India based on mutual interest and mutual respect.

This dual message -- openness without subordination -- reflects the changed political mood in Bangladesh. The electorate that propelled the new administration to power is acutely sensitive to questions of sovereignty and external interference. Any perception that Delhi is attempting to shape internal political outcomes would be self-defeating. Conversely, a posture of restraint could create space for rebuilding trust.

Encouragingly, recent gestures from India suggest a recognition of this reality. Prime Minister Narendra Modi phoned Rahman to congratulate him on his landslide victory. Delhi dispatched Lok Sabha Speaker Om Birla to attend the swearing-in ceremony and sent a formal letter inviting Rahman to visit India. These moves, modest but symbolically significant, have been widely interpreted in Dhaka as pragmatic overtures.

Symbolism, however, must be matched by substance.

If India seeks a sustainable relationship with post-election Bangladesh, it must adopt an approach grounded in non-interference, respect for sovereignty and pragmatic cooperation. The first step is an unambiguous commitment to neutrality in Bangladesh's domestic politics. This does not require India to abandon its interests; it requires recalibrating how those interests are pursued. Engagement with the government of the day is normal diplomacy. Perceived alignment with a particular party or leader is a liability.

Second, Delhi must accept that Dhaka's foreign policy will be diversified. Bangladesh has deepened ties with China, expanded economic engagement with the Gulf states and sought broader partnerships in Asia and beyond. Such diversification is not a zero-sum manoeuvre against India; it is a rational strategy for a mid-sized state navigating a competitive region. Attempts to frame Bangladesh's outreach to Beijing or Riyadh as inherently adversarial only reinforce the impression of Indian insecurity.

Third, tangible progress is needed on long-standing grievances. Chief among them is the Teesta River water-sharing agreement, unresolved for more than a decade. Water politics in Bangladesh are not abstract technicalities; they are tied to livelihoods, agriculture and regional equity. Failure to move forward on Teesta has become emblematic of perceived Indian reluctance to accommodate Bangladeshi concerns. A breakthrough -- even incremental -- would send a powerful signal that Delhi is prepared to translate rhetoric into reciprocity.

Border management is another area ripe for reset. Cross-border killings by India's Border Security Force have long inflamed public opinion in Bangladesh. Joint mechanisms to reduce fatalities, improve accountability and facilitate legal trade would serve both sides. Cooperation on counter-terrorism and transnational crime can continue, but it must be embedded in a framework that visibly respects human rights.

Economic interdependence offers a more hopeful canvas. India is one of Bangladesh's largest trading partners; Bangladesh is India's biggest trade partner in South Asia. Reducing non-tariff barriers, streamlining customs procedures and enhancing connectivity would yield mutual gains. Energy cooperation -- including electricity exports from India to Bangladesh -- has proven mutually beneficial and can be expanded in renewables and grid integration.

People-to-people ties, too, require careful tending. Visa facilitation for students, patients and business travellers would counteract the chill that has crept into public perceptions. Academic exchanges and cultural collaborations can help rebuild trust frayed by political rhetoric and media distortions.

None of this implies naivety about strategic competition in the Indo-Pacific. India has legitimate security concerns; Bangladesh has its own. The challenge is to manage these without allowing them to metastasise into suspicion. For Delhi, that means recognising that influence secured through perceived patronage is brittle. Influence rooted in consent and mutual benefit is durable.

The ball, as the saying goes, is in India's court. Bangladesh's new leadership has articulated a willingness to engage constructively. It has not closed doors; it has asked for them to be approached differently. The changed political landscape in Dhaka offers Delhi an opportunity to reset ties on firmer, more equal foundations.

Shared history will always matter. But history cannot substitute for policy. If India responds to this moment with humility, pragmatism and a clear-eyed understanding of Bangladesh's evolving political sensibilities, the relationship can emerge not diminished but matured. If it falls back on habits of overreach or selective engagement, mistrust will calcify.

South Asia's future will be shaped less by grand narratives of past solidarity than by the daily mechanics of cooperation between neighbours. Rebooting Indo-Bangla ties is not an act of charity or concession. It is a strategic necessity for both. The question is whether Delhi is ready to seize the opening.

mirmostafiz@yahoo.com