Reforming the ACC

One of the long-term recommendations of the Public Administration Reform Commission (PARC) that submitted its report in 2000 was to establish an Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC). Subsequently, the Government of Bangladesh did establish an Anti Corruption Commission (ACC) in 2004 by doing away with the Bureau of Anti Corruption. But the ACC has proved to be 'same wine in a new bottle', as it is no more independent than its previous incarnation, and the executive branch continues to wield similar direct and indirect control over it.

The ACC came into being under the Anti Corruption Commission Act, 2004, which provided a framework to prevent corruption and other corrupt practices in the country, conduct investigation, file cases for specific offences, and deal with other relevant matters related to corruption. It was linked to the Prevention of Corruption Act of 1947 and the Penal Code of 1860 with regard to offences. The former defined corruption as: (i) dishonest or fraudulent misappropriation or otherwise converting for one's own use any property entrusted to him or under his control as a public servant, or allowing any other person to do so; (ii) obtaining valuable things or pecuniary advantage by corrupt or illegal means, or by otherwise abusing his position as public servant; (iii) amassing wealth beyond known source of income. Subsequently, the then caretaker government framed the ACC Rules in 2007 to infuse fresh impetus to its anti-corruption drive.

In the backdrop mentioned above, the interim government of Bangladesh has recently constituted a commission headed by the eminent corruption-fighter and TIB-chief Dr Iftekharuzzaman to recommend measures for reforming the ACC. Submitting recommendations on such a critical issue within a span of three months will no doubt be a challenging task, but agreeing on an outline at the outset will facilitate the commission's onward journey. The following are some points that may be considered.

The first item that may be taken up is the framing of a comprehensive anti-corruption law, as the current law appears to be a fragmented one with linkages to other laws. The second element that should be considered is the formulation of comprehensive rules for making the ACC fully operational through amendment of current rules. And thirdly, a roadmap should be prepared for the management and organizational aspects of the ACC, which may include all management functions and operational roles, as well as how the entity can be turned into an institution from that of a mere organization. This roadmap in turn may be divided into short, medium, and long-term ones. As elaborated by Philip Selznick (1957), the criteria for transformation into an institution are: a distinct identity and unique competence; strong reputation and public legitimacy; and enduring viability through adaptation.

Since the 1960s, the anti-corruption agencies of Singapore and Hong Kong have proved to be the most successful ones in Southeast Asia. Therefore, the commission headed by TIB-chief may also review the experiences of those two agencies in curbing corruption over the years, in order to seek suitable ideas for appropriate applications in Bangladesh. The experience of Singapore is briefly discussed below, as its Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) has been hailed as a catalytic force in the emergence of Singapore as one of the most corruption-free states from that of a corruption-prone one.

In his famous book 'From Third World to First, The Singapore Story: 1965-2000', the first prime minister and founding father of modern Singapore Lee Kuan Yew (2000: 182-184)wrote: "We were sickened by the greed, corruption and decadence of many Asian leaders. We had a deep sense of mission to establish a clean and effective government. … We made sure from the day we took office in June 1959, that every dollar in revenue would be properly accounted for and would reach the beneficiaries at the grassroots as one dollar, without being siphoned off along the way. So, from the very beginning we gave special attention to the areas where discretionary powers had been exploited for personal gain, and sharpened instruments that could prevent, detect or deter such practices."

The CPIB has been the driving force in making Singapore one of the least corrupt nations from that of a state where corruption was endemic, especially in the police. The organization gradually achieved substantial authority, mandate and legitimacy to investigate any corruption case with support from political leadership. It successfully leveraged preventive, investigative and legal functions and demonstrated a strong alignment between the rationale for its existence and the strategies and practices it deployed. It enjoyed broad backing with robust internal support from employees and external backing from principal stakeholders. The institutionalisation of CPIB and Singapore's exceptional growth rate has remained closely intertwined giving rise to mutually reinforcing outcomes and a virtuous cycle. Its education and communication efforts have helped to turn public opinion against the use of cultural excuses for corruption as a way of life, which was common in the past.

CPIB's responsibilities include the investigation of corruption and malpractices, review of administrative weaknesses in the public sector that provide scope for corruption, and the screening of officers for appointment in the civil service. It can also investigate corruption by expatriate Singaporeans, as it has the mandate to investigate corrupt acts in both public and private sectors. Alongside regular training and communication activities for public servants, CPIB officials even attend school classes for explaining the harmful effects of corruption. A critical lever of its authority and centrality is that it reports directly to the prime minister; moreover, it is constitutionally enabled to shift to a reporting structure under the president if the prime minister becomes the object of investigation.

The Prevention of Corruption Act (POCA) of 1960 has been the edifice upon which CPIB has been built. It contained aspects that eliminated legislative weaknesses, enhanced legal powers, and increased personnel. The law also bestowed it sweeping investigative powers and stipulated severe penalties for corrupt behaviour. The five most notable features in CPIB's virtuous cycle of institutionalisation have been political will cum support, adequate legislative mandate, clearly defined roles, competitive compensation, and a performance culture.

[email protected]