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6 years ago

Post-Brexit UK-EU cooperation in foreign and security policy

British Prime Minister Theresa May, left, walks with European Council President Donald Tusk prior to a meeting at the Europa building in Brussels on December 08, 2017. -- Photo: AP
British Prime Minister Theresa May, left, walks with European Council President Donald Tusk prior to a meeting at the Europa building in Brussels on December 08, 2017. -- Photo: AP

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Analysts have noted that close cooperation between the United Kingdom (UK) and the European Union (EU) in the area of foreign and security policy is expected to continue after Brexit. This is because the UK, a permanent member of the UN Security Council, a member of North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO), the G7 and G20 and also the sixth largest global economy, will remain a significant, though somewhat diminished, global actor even after Brexit.

On the other hand, some have suggested that UK's very likely weakened economic and financial situation would impact on resources for its armed forces and development assistance. Furthermore, it is also likely that UK might become embroiled in internal constitutional, political, economic and social disputes for the foreseeable future. In this context, it has been noted that the question of a second Scottish independence referendum hangs in the air while the Irish question may also resurface. There might therefore be less time and energy for foreign and security policy.

The matrix will be complex. It is apparent that the EU wishes, in principle, to maintain a close relationship with the UK not only on common foreign and security policy (CFSP) but also on matters of common security and defence policy (CSDP). It is being suggested that existing treaties might be used to craft a new partnership agreement. The devil will, however, be in the detail. Much will depend on the overall atmosphere of the Brexit negotiations. An acrimonious divorce might have consequences across the board while an amicable parting of ways would lead to a more cooperative relationship including in CFSF/CSDP.

THREE CIRCLES:  Since 1945, UK has traditionally viewed its foreign policy as having three overlapping circles: the US, Europe and the Commonwealth. In recent decades, the importance of the Commonwealth has steadily declined. This has led Britain to look more towards Europe and across the Atlantic. Their Foreign Office is regarded as being more pro-EU while the Ministry of Defence is considered as being more pro-US.

The UK, it needs to be remembered has been, since the 1990s, a major troop provider in stabilisation missions in the Balkans, an early supporter of the EU's role in the Iran negotiations and has pushed for a tough EU response to Russia after the annexation of Crimea. Presently, it tends to support the EU role more in the immediate neighbourhood (Balkans, North Africa) than further afield. The UK, once in a while, also prefers to align itself with the US, Australia, Canada, and Malaysia.

 It may be recalled that during the Brexit referendum campaign, there was little reference to foreign policy. Proponents of Brexit made much of alleged plans for a European army but there was little serious discussion of the potential implications for the UK operating on its own outside the EU framework. Nevertheless during her visit to the US, Prime Minister Theresa May said Britain would take on an 'even more internationalist role, where we meet our responsibilities to our friends and allies, champion the international cooperation and partnerships that project our values around the world, and continue to act as one of the strongest and most forceful advocates for business, free markets and free trade anywhere around the globe. In her letter of March 2017 that triggered the procedure for the UK to leave the EU through Article 50, Theresa May repeated UK's wish to see a strong and secure EU and later stated that the UK was unconditionally committed to maintaining European security.

POSITION PAPER ON FOREIGN AND SECURITY POLICY: The desired nuance was reflected in UK's position paper on foreign and security policy published in mid-September. It stated that the UK wanted 'a deep and special partnership' across the board in external relations that 'goes beyond existing third-country arrangements.' It trumpeted the UK's major role in providing for European security and defence and stated that 'this will continue, and UK interests will also be served, through strengthened bilateral relationships.' This suggests that the UK 'would contribute military assets to EU operations, cooperate on sanctions and agree joint positions on foreign policy' as part of a Brexit deal. Brexit Secretary David Davis has added: 'It is in our mutual interest to work closely with the EU and its member states on terrorism and extremism, illegal migration, cyber-crime, and conventional state-based military aggression.'

Nevertheless, while reiterating the need for having inter-active foreign and security policy there also exists in today's UK the thinking that Brexit will open new trading opportunities thus allowing the UK to pursue its 'Global Britain' strategy. Fraser Cameron has consequently noted that this mercantilist drive has indeed become a dominant foreign policy theme with Johnson and International Trade Secretary Liam Fox. They believe that such a path would enable the UK to pursue advantageous deals with the US, China, India, Australia and others.

Such a mercantilist foreign policy might, however, mean not only less willingness to support the EU's already weakening normative agenda but also a risk of a reduced commitment to the development agenda. According to some economists, in the short term, there is likely to be a preference for trade promotion over development aid.

Post-Brexit, the UK will likely give more priority to NATO, at a time when pressure on its military budget and capabilities is likely to grow. Expenditure on Trident and the aircraft carriers might mean further army reductions, which would make it difficult for the UK to assume any additional responsibilities.

Though there is no detailed official guidance on Britain's future foreign policy cooperation with the EU, the position paper emphasised that the UK and the EU should remain 'close partners' in foreign policy issues and this could be done 'through regular dialogue and specific cooperation.' It is also clear that the UK would like to collaborate with the European Defence Agency (EDA) and participate in the Commission's various research programmes related to priority areas like Cyber security, development policy and migration.

Commenting on this issue in the House of Lords in July 2017, the former Foreign Secretary, William Hague, while agreeing that after Brexit the UK might have a slightly diminished influence, urged that need existed for the closest possible cooperation with the EU on foreign and security policy. To enhance British influence, Hague has suggested that Britain should seek to keep its seat as an Observer on the EU's Political and Security Committee (PSC). He has also proposed that the UK might still second experts to the European External Action Service (EEAS), share intelligence and continue to participate in CSDP operations.

NORWEGIAN MODEL: In this context, some analysts have suggested that the UK could copy the Norwegian model as Norway enjoys a regular dialogue with the EU on foreign and security policy via the EEA agreement and usually aligns itself with EU positions and declarations. It may also be mentioned here that Norway has an agreement which permits it to engage in CSDP operations and also cooperate with the European Defence Agency.

All these facets tend to indicate the possibility of the UK eventually entering a Norway Plus arrangement. This would be consistent with the long UK involvement in EU policymaking in general and its foreign and security policy fields in particular.

Fraser Cameron of the European Policy Centre appears to have correctly identified that Britain's development of its future relationship with the EU in foreign and security policy will largely depend on two issues. The first will relate to UK's broad positioning in global affairs. This will be determined by the   extent it will seek to act autonomously, and also to what extent as a close partner of the EU, or even as the junior transatlantic partner to the US. The second factor will depend on developments within the EU itself. The connotation arises from the question as to whether in a post-Brexit world, the EU will form a more cohesive and effective foreign and security policy or whether it will remain divided as it was on evolving situations in Iraq, Libya and Syria. We have seen many European leaders pushing for a stronger EU in security and defence matters. However, recent events have also indicated that the EU nearly always finds great difficulty in moving forward in this sensitive arena. The differences in outlook that are being created through populism and ultra-right fundamentalism are now beginning to become significant.

One thing is, however, quite clear. It will be difficult to separate the future UK-EU relationship in foreign and security policy from the final elements that will constitute the Brexit divorce settlement. An amicable separation will create goodwill towards constructive engagement and cooperation. A controversial parting of the ways might, however, impact on foreign and security policy.

The writer, a former Ambassador, is an analyst specialised in foreign affairs, right to information and good governance.

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