Reinvigorating the interim government: Challenges and the path forward

Exactly two months have passed since the interim government assumed office on August 8. Although it may be premature to fully assess its performance, it is worth reflecting on its progress and the challenges it faces. The “July Revolution” — led by the heroic student movement that overthrew one of the most oppressive regimes in recent history — continues to resonate throughout the country. The people, still relishing the freedom they fought so hard for, remain inspired by the overthrow of autocracy.

However, the initial euphoria that followed the revolution is beginning to fade. Tangible progress toward achieving the revolution’s goals has been slow, and the interim government’s disorganised decision-making has raised doubts about its capacity to navigate the complex political landscape. This threatens to dampen the optimism that surged across the nation just weeks ago.

While we wish the interim government’s success, some hard but necessary questions must be asked: Has the government adequately clarified its constitutional mandate? Has it laid out clear goals and provided a roadmap to achieve them? Most critically, does the government appear capable of fulfilling its primary responsibility — ensuring a smooth transition to a democratically elected government? The answers to these questions will determine whether the interim government’s legacy will be one of realized potential or missed opportunities.

Symbolism vs. Substance: Let us start by examining the composition of the government. The appointment of Nobel laureate Professor M. Yunus as the head of the interim administration was widely praised at home and abroad. At 84, Yunus remains a symbol of moral authority, offering a sense of stability and ethical leadership as the nation recovers from the shackles of autocracy. His presence reassures many that the country is in safe hands, at least symbolically.

However, the same level of confidence does not extend to many of Yunus’ advisors. Tasked with guiding the country through this critical transition, several advisors appear to lack the vigor and dynamism required for such a monumental responsibility. As the administration works to rebuild after the fall of the autocratic regime, serious questions arise about whether Yunus’ inner circle has the drive and competence needed to lead the country effectively. More importantly, do they inspire the confidence of the people that they are the right individuals for the job?

This is a pivotal issue because Yunus’ symbolic leadership alone is not enough to ensure the success of the interim government. The people are not just looking for symbols of change; they want tangible results. The success of this administration depends not only on Yunus’ ability to inspire but also on the competence and action-oriented mindset of those who surround him.

Reform commissions: One of the clearest signs of disorganization within the government has been the creation of six separate reform commissions. Was it truly necessary to establish so many? Wouldn’t a single commission with multiple subcommittees have been more efficient? Instead, this approach has led to confusion and overlapping mandates, creating uncertainty about the commissions’ roles and objectives.

For instance, the commissions on constitutional reform and electoral reform have been set up as separate entities, despite these two areas are deeply interconnected. How can one realistically address electoral reform without tackling constitutional issues, and vice versa? The separation of these commissions seems not only impractical but also counterproductive.

Concerns also arise regarding the leadership of these commissions. One chairperson was replaced almost immediately after being appointed, while another declined the role altogether, suggesting a lack of proper consultation before these appointments were made. Such hasty and poorly thought-out decisions do little to inspire confidence in the government’s planning and organizational capabilities.

Particularly troubling is the case of the constitutional reform commission. Initially headed by a legal scholar, the leadership was quickly shifted to a political scientist. While political science certainly has relevance to constitutional reform, shouldn’t the country’s highest legal framework be overseen by an eminent legal expert? Are we to believe that there are no qualified legal minds in the nation capable of steering this commission?

The delays in the commissions beginning their work further highlight the lack of preparation. Scheduled to start on October 1, their work was postponed because the government realized at the last minute that political parties needed to be consulted on potential reforms. This lack of foresight raises concerns about the government’s ability to handle complex reforms within the constraints of political realities.

The identity crisis: This brings us to a larger, more pressing question: What is the nature of this interim government? Is it a revolutionary government, tasked with implementing fundamental reforms as demanded by the student movement? Or is it simply a caretaker administration whose primary responsibility is to organize free and fair elections?

The student leaders installed the interim government through the presidential office without abrogating the constitution, choosing instead to work within its framework. A truly revolutionary government might have rewritten the constitution to chart a new direction for the nation. However, by choosing not to do so, the interim government has limited its ability to introduce sweeping changes.

Given these constraints, the government should focus on the most urgent reforms needed to ensure a free and fair election, leaving broader reforms for the next elected government to handle. Attempting to reform every area of governance may prove too ambitious and could lead to failure on all fronts.

Administrative missteps: The interim government has also made several poor administrative decisions, including reinstating civil servants dismissed by the previous regime for political reasons. While compensating these individuals for lost job and income may be fair, reappointing them to key positions after such long absences could disrupt the smooth functioning of the civil service. A more measured approach, such as creating an administrative commission to address their grievances, would have been a more effective solution.

In addition, the government canceled contractual appointments and forced many senior civil servants into compulsory retirement, leaving top-tier officials, especially those aligned with the former regime, feeling demoralized. To address the leadership gap, the government could consider a bold move: hiring a special batch of senior civil servants on an emergency basis through lateral entry. This would involve recruiting skilled individuals from outside the civil service — business leaders, civic society members, and others — for a temporary period, perhaps two years. Such an approach could bring fresh energy and ideas into the civil service, giving the government the strong leadership it currently lacks.

The dysfunction within the administration became further evident with the appointment of 59 deputy commissioners, eight of whom had their appointments revoked the following day due to external pressure. Scapples by disgruntled officers, coupled with allegations of corruption surrounding these appointments, have raised serious concerns about the government’s competence. The lack of swift action to address these issues sends mixed signals about the government’s ability to manage effectively.

The police force, deeply demoralized and corrupted under the previous regime, remains in complete disarray. Instead of attempting to reintegrate compromised officials, the government could consider recruiting a special batch of officers to restore the force’s integrity. This move would likely be seen as a positive step by the students who fought for quota reform and as an effort by the interim government to involve them in shaping the post-autocratic governance of the country. It would also inject fresh, reform-minded individuals into the much-criticized police force, helping to revitalize it.

The way forward: In conclusion, the interim government faces an urgent need to define its course. It must decide whether to embrace a bold, revolutionary path that fulfills the student movement’s aspirations or to act solely as a caretaker focused on organising elections. To move forward, the government must make critical choices: replace weak advisors with capable and courageous leaders, clarify its constitutional authority, and present a clear plan for the reforms it seeks to implement.

The government must also reinvigorate the civil and police administrations to restore public confidence and ensure stability during this crucial transition. The stakes are too high for indecision or half-hearted measures. The interim government must seize this revolutionary moment or risk letting a rare opportunity for transformative change slip away in vain.

Dr. Dowlah is a retired Professor of Economics and Law in the United States. Currently, he serves as the Chairperson of the Bangladesh Institute of Policy Studies. (www.bipsglobal.org).