Right-wing an important factor in next European parliament elections

An interesting analytical scrutiny carried out by Corina Stratulat Levente Kocsis on the next European Parliament elections has drawn attention all over the world. It reflects the anxiety that has slowly surfaced about how the election might end up with "as much as a quarter of the seats going to nationalistic, radical right-wing lawmakers". Many others from across the globe, already worried about what is happening in Ukraine, Gaza, and the question of migration, are expressing anxiety that such a development within the newly composed legislature could create deadlocks within the paradigm of EU integration and policymaking at a time when geopolitics calls for more - rather than less - unity and ambition in the Union's action.

Analysts are referring to some reasons that are fuelling  anxiety and lending credibility to these unsettling forecasts. They are-- (a) radical right parties continuing to make inroads into power at the national level in the member states; (b) the European electoral arena generally proving to be more accessible to them than many other national parliaments, and (c) sustained apparent dissatisfaction with some conventional political representatives that may eventually translate into protest votes on different issues.

In addition, there is also concern that poor turnout during the voting could benefit the hardliners. Nevertheless, some others following the evolving situation are realising that even if the participation rate goes up again, like in 2019, and as recent polls suggest, the substance of the election campaigns could still prove favourable for the far-right. By moving away from the anti-EU mantra and showing readiness to have difficult conversations on divisive subjects, the radicals can appear more appealing to electorates than the mainstream parties.

Such projections are suggesting that Europe might well be heading down a nationalist, protectionist, anti-Islamic, and non-liberal path after the upcoming EP vote. Such a situation has, however, been not agreed with by the citizens believing in liberal democratic rights.

However, there is also another dimension. Focused on the pursuit of a more honest relationship with citizens, radical populists tend to only gesture towards policy when they win elections at the national or EU level. This makes them more eclectic and moralistic than programmatic, and so less dangerous in terms of direct policy influence. This could change if they score big in the upcoming European elections.

Using roll-call voting records collected by Eulytix, a survey has revealed that the average proportion of MEPs tend to align themselves with the winning side in voting sessions across the outgoing Parliament. The results have disclosed that the members of radical rightwing groups-- i.e. the Independents (NI), Identity and Democracy (ID), and European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR) - have been much less likely to agree with the outcome of a voting session compared to their centrist or left-wing counterparts. Consequently, they have emerged as the least influential groups during the present mandate (2019-2024).

In part, the reason why the rise of far-right parties in the European Parliament has so far not translated into direct policy impact is linked to their inter- and intra-group cohesion problems. Indeed, the analysis in this Paper shows that, apart from the NI, the most non-cohesive families in the European Parliament are the ID and ECR groups. The NI seems to be the least cohesive, while the Greens/EFA group has emerged as the most unified group of all.

Similar results have emerged when factions were clustered into coalitions. In this regard, the coalition consisting of the radical right-wing groups (i.e. ID and ECR) transpired as least able to determine policy outcomes, while mainstream parties appeared best placed to call the shots on decisions. The Eulytix study has also indicated that radical right-wingers would need to win, on average, 72 per cent of the seats in the EP to be able to completely control vote outcomes on their own. Such a scenario appears to be unlikely.

It has also been revealed through this examination that the far-right has significant divisions on budgetary issues, relations with third countries (for instance, Russia and Ukraine), and employment policy. Contrary to this, in areas linked to EU institutions, public health, and, most notably, the environment and energy, the radical populist right exhibits greater unity.

Judging by their preferred type of engagement with EP activities, far-right parties seem aware of their lack of real influence on legislation. Data also showed that in the outgoing Parliament, the members of the ID and ECR groups wrote a disproportionately large number of questions to the European Commission by reference to their size. It is believed that if their ranks swelled after the June European elections, far-right parties could gain confidence to shift from simply seeking publicity to trying to shape policy.

To assess the potential effects of more radical right-wing MEPs in the next European Parliament on individual policy files, the authors also conducted a simulation study, evaluating how different the outcome of votes would be if the far-right had a higher share of seats in the Assembly, as recent forecasts predict for the upcoming elections. The results reveal that the far Right is likely to pay more attention to environmental policy, social affairs, agriculture and external relations. Such a scenario needs to be welcomed. The centre-right groups, especially the European People's Party (EPP), might then feel more persuaded to move further right. They could do so by adopting the provocative vocabulary and restrictive positions of the radicals to recapture electorates by updating democracy through reform.

It needs to be remembered here that since the 1990s, parties that were once confined to the ideological right and left margins of the political system have steadily increased their presence in the traditional space of politics through electoral success and media coverage in many, including key, member states.

In this context, in November 2023, the far-right, anti-Islam Party for Freedom (PVV) came first in the Dutch general elections and in March 2024, the far-right, populist Chega stunned all with a solid third place in the snap vote held in Portugal. Moreover, national conservative, right-wing parties are currently soaring in the polls in countries like Austria (Freedom Party), Belgium (Flemish Interest and New Flemish Alliance) and France (Rassemblement National), promising to shift politics (further) to the right at the next ballot. Thus, past and recent experiences suggest that now, radical populists are not a passing, accidental mood; they manifest a clear and consistent trend to field/ feed elections at all levels.

The popularity of such parties appears to be problematic for the countries in which they thrive, especially if they come in office and start attacking core democratic institutions like the judiciary and the independence of the media (as in Hungary under Fidesz, Poland under the Law and Justice, or Italy under Forza Italia). Their success unfortunately can also prove a liability for the EU. As part of the government in countries like Hungary, Italy, Finland, and Slovakia, members of far-right parties now sit around the (European) Council table and enjoy direct opportunities to project their nativist and populist platforms with the intention of destabilising patterns of political interaction also on the European tier.

All these factors can persuade citizens to increasingly perceive the radical right parties as convincing political options at any election. This might then enable them (right parties) to score big in the upcoming EP vote. If they end up tilting the balance of power in the next EP towards the right, the results can echo and reinforce similar, existing tendencies in the (European) Council. This development would also be consequential for agenda-sending and policymaking across EU institutions. The effect could also spill back to the national level, where mainstream parties in the member states could come under ever more political pressure to refrain (even more) from their EU integration and reform ambitions. The far-right forces in the next EP could also complicate the approval of the inbound College of Commissioners.

Such an emerging dimension should also be seen against the backdrop where the number of populist radical right parties in the European Parliament rose by 12.5 per cent in the 2014 elections and consolidated again in 2019, when they won 161 seats - compared to 118 five years earlier.

However, judged by participation rates, voters do not seem to have picked up on these upgrades. Turnout dropped from 62 per cent in 1972 to 42.6 per cent in 2014. Subsequently, at the latest elections in 2019, turnout went up for the first time in over two decades, reaching 50.7 per cent. The higher level of participation in the previous EP vote was arguably a key factor why far-right parties had a poorer electoral showing than expected in 2018/early 2019.

Interestingly, far-right parties (e.g. in France and Italy) no longer run on an EU exit ticket, rather speak about the need to change the Union. This rhetorical adjustment could resonate with public sentiment that stretches beyond radical constituencies into the mainstream electorate.

Before concluding one also needs to refer to the EC survey24 carried out in January this year in 12 member states. It revealed that many citizens - not just far right voters - have a rather negative appreciation of the EU's handling of recent crises, i.e. the COVID-19 pandemic, financial crisis, and the wars in Ukraine and Gaza. The same goes for public perceptions of traditional politicians' performance and intentions when it comes to policy areas that animate voters, like climate change and immigration, which are also seen in negative terms.  For instance, one must not overlook the recent farmers' protests which turned violent in Belgium, Germany, Greece, Spain, Poland, and Spain. These have been identified as the latest example of citizens' disapproving of EU politicians' legislative efforts on sensitive issues.

Muhammad Zamir, a former Ambassador, is an analyst specialised in foreign affairs, right to information and good governance.

[email protected]