A vanished vision or a deferred opportunity

In the early 2000s, Bangladesh was envisioning a maritime breakthrough strategically located on the Bay of Bengal, offering natural depth, proximity to transhipment routes, and a convenient release valve for Chittagong's increasing congestion - the Sonadia Deep Sea Port (DSP). With satisfactory feasibility studies completed and investment interests growing, Sonadia seemed inevitable, only to find, years later, the project has quietly disappeared from national strategic plans. What happened to it? How?

All evidence points to the fact that the answer lies in political avoidance, as the project was never officially abandoned; instead, environmental concerns over the island's Ramsar status were cited publicly, and they functioned more as a diplomatic alibi. Sonadia meets most but not all the criteria for recognition yet, so it is not officially designated as a Wetland of International Importance under the Ramsar Convention yet. This only shows that the environmental issue was not the trigger; the real reason was geopolitical discomfort. Because we have witnessed the Rampal's case during the same governance where the Sundarbans was already a designated site under the same convention. Actually, with China positioned to finance and build the port, India persistently kept raising objections over what it perceived as tiptoeing Chinese influence on its maritime periphery. There are also opinions that the United States and Japan were also wary of China's expanding and much-discussed Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) and subtly signalled their disapproval.

Faced with these frictions, the then government shelved Sonadia rather than confronting competing interests or negotiating a balancing solution. As a substitution, the Japanese-backed Matarbari Port was fast-tracked and rebranded as an alternative, with a different economic focus. Was this in Bangladesh's Interest?

In immediate diplomatic terms, this withdrawal might have seemed prudent at the time, but strategically it was a compromise-not just in terms of a project, but in terms of the country's sovereign decision-making. The then Awami League government developed a pattern of conceding to the sensitivities of stronger counterparts-mainly India in particular, but not only India. On several infrastructure and energy projects, public-private partnerships, and even policy alignments in bilateral and multilateral forums, the government appeared increasingly reactive to foreign preferences rather than being assertive of local interests. On this, critics in the field of 'democratic governance' highlight the detractions as bartering legitimacy in exchange of entertaining vested foreign interests.

In the case of Sonadia, the port located on the shortest maritime route for landlocked Northeast India, Myanmar, and parts of Bhutan and Nepal, had the potential to be a regional logistics hub. So, when it had become morally and politically compromised, there was a deeper sense of having lost autonomy in thinking, planning, and executing infrastructure on BD's own terms. Fingers could be pointed to the consistent favouring of myopic and one-eyed alternatives over competitive ones, the absence of transparent national debate on mega projects, or the increasing reliance on donor "approval" before pushing through strategic initiatives. But, should Bangladesh have tried to find an accommodating solution?

Yes-and not just theoretically. Bangladesh could have, and should have, pursued an accommodating model that preserved its strategic autonomy while respecting regional sensitivities. The context was not without options. It could have pursued a multi-partner model-inviting investments from Japan, South Korea, ASEAN nations, or even multilateral development banks to balance Chinese involvement, addressing the geopolitical concerns without abandoning the project's economic rationale.

Environmental objections, too, were not insurmountable. Bangladesh could have advanced stricter environmental conditions, proposed phased development to limit disruption, and invested in marine conservation offsets to preserve the ecological character of Sonadia. Rather than accept opposition as a dead end, the then government could have used it to demonstrate innovation and responsibility. Most critically, the government could have emphasised transparency by publishing the technical and economic justifications for the port, inviting national debate, and elucidating the project's strategic intent.

But none of these routes were taken. There was little incentive or capacity within the government when foreign approval or disapproval had become so structurally embedded in the planning process. Country's intellectuals, engineers, and planners were largely sidelined. To preserve a manufactured image internationally, national policies were shaped more in ambassadorial meetings and development aid reviews than through public institutions and open consultations.

Now, the important question-- can and should Bangladesh recall the plan?

Absolutely-but it must start by reasserting its intellectual and strategic independence. Prior to that, some overarching phases need to address all the elephants in the room first.

l Reframe and rebrand Sonadia as a non-aligned economic asset, not a geopolitical pawn. Bangladesh should present it as a key plank in strategic visions ahead, focused on export competitiveness, regional integration, and maritime trade, not strategic alignment.

l Deploy environmental innovations like low-impact construction, floating terminals, and strong marine biodiversity to offset and address conservation concerns.

l Invite diversified stakeholders or joint ventures, such as South Korea, Japan, China, the USA, Turkey, ASEAN countries, or neutral European or Gulf investors, to co-finance the project alongside development banks, thereby reducing overreliance on any single country.

l Communicate transparently and make the economic rationale, cost-benefit calculations, and governance structure public to earn domestic trust and international credibility.

Above all, Bangladesh must restore the role of its local thinkers-engineers, economists, geographers, and public policy experts- with transferred technological know-how in shaping such decisions.

Lastly, in simple terms, a government caught in the gravitational pulls of stronger, and/or not-so-neighbourly sovereign actors failed to act in the interest of its people. But it is not too late to correct that. But doing so requires Bangladesh to believe again in its own vision and to trust its capacity to balance in the pursuit of development.

Hossain Mohammed Omar Khayum is a development economist and policy researcher.
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