BRICS: tower of 'southern' power, or just another brick in the wall?

Jim O'Neill of Goldman Sachs coined the BRIC name in 2001 for four countries he thought would dominate the global economy by 2050: Brazil, Russia, India, and China. They met on the sidelines of both the July 2006 G8 meeting in St. Petersburg and the September 2006 U.N. General Assembly in New York, before formalising the name at Yeketarinburg, Russia, on June 16, 2009. South Africa's joining in 2010 extended the name, but in hosting the August 22-4, 2023 Summit under the 'BRICS and Africa' theme, might challenge the union's existence.

Key questions arise: Is today's BRICS a reaction to the 'west'? With Russia sidelined and China the new 'western' villain, will 'Global South' priorities reset the BRICS identity?

At least 71 invitations to the Summit were made after the avalanche of admission seekers ballooned from 19 countries in April 2023 to 41 by August. Bangladesh is among them, as too Indonesia, Iran, Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates from Asia, and Argentina from Latin America. Africa dominated with 8: Algeria, Egypt, Ethiopia, Nigeria, Senegal, Sudan, Tunisia, and Zimbabwe. Notably, France's request to attend was politely declined.

Wanted by international police, Vladimir Putin will not attend in person, but other original members will be physically present. Narendra Modi will find the occasion to canvas for the G20 Summit his country will host next month; Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva can further the 'Global South' campaign he has led since his return to office (and as next year's G20 host), even though he is lukewarm about expanding BRICS membership; and Xi Jinping, who has long funded Africa's infrastructural renaissance, needs to counter being cornered by 'west'-based military groupings. Japan, South Korea, and the United States signed a defence, security, and technology agreement only this week in Camp David; three Anglo-Saxon countries, Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States had concluded the AUKUS military organisation in September 2021; and now that the Cold War is over, the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation seeks expansion from the 'Atlantic' zone to the Pacific Ocean.

Whether BRICS reignites the fused 'non-alignment movement' of the 1950s and 1960s, or displays sharper teeth than the 'Third World' grouping during the 1970s, resentment was thickened by Ukrainian war spillovers. Chastising even an emaciated Russia is not a present BRICS concern, but soaring grain prices hitting many African countries exposes how an old grievance can be sharpened for concurrent usage. In the Second Russia-Africa Summit, held in St. Petersburg during July 2023 (the 'First' was in October 2019), 17 African leaders (turnout was lower than in 2019), asked for "urgently" ending the war. Cyril Ramaphosa, the Johannesburg Summit host, even claimed the "right to call for peace." Putin did not budge, but he wrote off 90 million USD of African debt.

Against the Johannesburg Summit theme of 'BRICS and Africa', the continent's economy needs far more hope than just that. It could emerge as the Summit's key topic. The continent rallied to establish the African Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (AfCFTA) in 2019 under the umbrella of the 'African Union Agenda 2063: The Africa We Want'. With 55 member countries and 8 regional economic communities, AfCFTA serves 1.3 billion people whose countries together command a GDP of 3.4 trillion USD, and hopes to "attract investment, boost trade, provide better jobs, reduce poverty, and increase shared prosperity in Africa." Intra-Africa trade would rise from the 14.4 per cent of total trade today, while eventual tariff elimination would cut trade deficits enormously. Not only does the Johannesburg Summit provide the perfect platform to elicit external trading partners, for example, in Latin America and the Middle East, but also nudge BRICS in a slightly different trajectory. Unlike the 'west', which is resorting to military means to reduce Russia from prominence, the BRICS-African approach has been more collaborative, using an economic wherewithal to escape growing global contestations.

Even more 'homegrown' to African countries is to pump up the New Development Bank (NDB), often dubbed 'BRICS Bank'. It has had a low-profiled 8-year existence, but growing global financial jitters may ignite it in a way few other catalysers could. It would make development borrowings more indigenous given how borrowings from the 'west' or China only cost more. Yet at a time when food prices keep peaking and energy prices reach new highs, developing countries desperately need not only a financial break as they stand at the cusp of breakthroughs, but also to not go in to 'bat' for other global powers.

Too many forces could get in the way. A rather lethargic past was filled with increasing sputtering: Brazil under a disdainful Jair Bolsonaro; Modi's strong 'western' ties; Ukraine War consequences (once a fragile China-Russia balance within BRICS now tilts China's way); and of course domestic African strife, highlighted by wars in Tigray and South Sudan, among other places, as well as the recent coup in Niger. Whatever the outcome, the tone will change. U.N. Secretary General António Gutteres' observation that "the post-Cold War period is over" may have aptly captured the prevailing uneasiness.

In a new BRICS climate, we can expect membership to grow, meaning more 'bricks' will be added to the growing wall of disengagement from a 'west'-driven post-World War II order. What will replace it remains unclear, but the name cannot absorb more additions. After the Cold War, a 'New World Order' experimented with 'neo-liberalism' in the 1990s, based on John Williamson's 'Washington Consensus', anti-terrorism at the start of the new century revolved around the 'either you are with us or against' theme, then a healthy China-U.S. economic tussle catapulted into military drum-beats.

The dust remains unsettled, but a BRICS survival may depend less on these external or exogenous forces than internal and endogenous. One slice of reality already being capitalised upon can be furthered, while another potentially favourable slice needs extra efforts. That reality 'slice' is historical and more at the forefront now than ever before: to stop drifting in 'western' directions over global-impacting decisions. How the modern 'west' enslaved Africans and colonised their lands so brutally is more pregnant a memory today than ever before across Africa. No wonder they prefer paying more than double the interest-rate for Chinese loans (5 per  cent) than World Bank's (2 per cent): not only are there no 'strings' to get them, but above all, China, like Russia, carries no enslavement or land confiscation stigma.  Not supporting the 'west' in the Ukraine War, regardless of its origin, embodies that spirit. As to Russia's invasion itself: Putin had repeatedly warned NATO not to expand to Russia's border.

The other 'slice' relates to efforts to institutionalise more BRICS proposals. Obvious examples include reinvigorating the NDB, and through a new currency, directly tackle the pet interests of many aspiring members of boosting their own economies. Loans aplenty will be needed. Many aspiring BRICS members have lots of unused cash, but equally, many others, mostly across Africa, need that cash. Political wisdom may help the BRICS Johannesburg Summit lay BRICS to rest, but also the bricks of 'Southern' power to build a tower. Otherwise another missed opportunity could be the last straw for both. Either way, a new chapter looms large.

Imtiaz A. Hussain is Professor, Department of Global Studies & Governance (GSG) Independent University, Bangladesh (IUB). imtiaz.hussain@iub.edu.bd